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UNITED STATES v. GAMMAGE: EIGHTH CIRCUIT AGREES NO 
“SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE” FOR THE GOVERNMENT AT 
RESENTENCING 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a district court judge who recently applied a sentencing 
enhancement to a defendant at sentencing.  Further imagine that, on appeal, the 
appellate court found insufficient evidence to support the enhancement and 
remanded the case for resentencing.  At resentencing, the government seeks to 
introduce additional evidence, not offered at the first sentencing hearing, that 
would support the sentencing enhancement.  Should you allow the evidence? 
Your first step would be to examine the appellate court’s order.  Although 
the appellate court clearly articulated the error of insufficient supporting 
evidence, it simply stated that the case was remanded for proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.  You then look to circuit precedent, only to see 
restrictions implemented in some circumstances but not others, without a clear 
explanation of the distinction.  What do you do? 
What if, perhaps, the shoe was on the other foot?  Imagine you are an 
appellate judge reviewing the propriety of an application of a sentencing 
enhancement.  Assuming the sentencing enhancement was erroneously 
imposed due to the government’s failure to meet its burden, what would you 
do?  Would you allow the government another opportunity to introduce 
evidence at resentencing?  Would certain circumstances change your opinion? 
Until recently, conclusive, controlling authority on this subject has been 
absent.  While, for more than two decades, much attention has been given to 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the appropriate weight judges 
should give to those Guidelines, this problem is simply beyond their scope.1 
 
 1. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 11011 (2007) (upholding sentencing 
outside the Sentencing Guidelines’ range for crack cocaine); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 245 (2005) (holding that the federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 30304 (2004) (defining a state statutory maximum to which a judge 
may sentence a defendant as the maximum a judge may impose without any additional fact 
finding); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (requiring a jury trial for sentences 
imposed above a state statutory maximum).  For a brief discussion concerning the history of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1–2, available at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/ 
index.cfm; see also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, NANCY J. KING & SUSAN R. KLEIN, FEDERAL 
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Thankfully, the Eighth Circuit recently provided clear guidelines for the 
admission of additional evidence upon resentencing.  In United States v. 
Gammage, the Eighth Circuit correctly crafted a clear rule preventing the 
government, absent special circumstances, from making multiple attempts to 
present sufficient evidence for sentencing enhancements at resentencing.2  In 
Gammage, the district court erroneously imposed a sentencing enhancement 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).3  In reversing, the Eighth 
Circuit limited the government to the existing record at resentencing.4  Unlike 
earlier, similar holdings, the Eighth Circuit discussed the applicable scope on 
resentencing and set forth guidelines for future courts in similar 
circumstances.5 
Part I of this Note will discuss Eighth Circuit precedent prior to Gammage.  
Parts II and III will discuss the facts and holding of Gammage, as well as the 
legal principles that support the holding.  Part IV of this Note will examine the 
current similarities and discrepancies among the circuits with this rule.  
Finally, Part V will discuss the subsequent Eight Circuit applications of 
Gammage. 
I.  CONFLICTING EIGHTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT PRE-GAMMAGE 
As an initial matter, Congress has prescribed, and courts have agreed, that 
district and appellate courts have the authority to resentence defendants in a 
variety of contexts.6  The general contours of this authority are prescribed by 
statute and are not limitless.7  Unfortunately, Eighth Circuit precedent before 
Gammage inconsistently applied limitations at resentencing, which Gammage 
confronted.8 
A. Sentencing Enhancements Generally 
In the federal context, a sentencing enhancement is ordinarily either 
statutorily authorized or provided for in the Sentencing Guidelines, as 
 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 526.1 (3d ed. 2004) (summarizing the history and application of 
the Guidelines). 
 2. 580 F.3d 777, 77980 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 3. Id. at 778–79; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
 4. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779. 
 5. Id. at 77980. 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1992) (remanding 
the case for resentencing to determine whether an enhanced sentence was proper). 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. Compare, e.g., Cornelius, 968 F.2d at 706 (8th Cir. 1992) (refraining from limiting the 
scope of resentencing), with United States v. Hudson, 129 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam) (applying limitations on the scope of resentencing).  See also infra Part I.D (discussing 
inconsistent applications of resentencing limitations in recent Eighth Circuit precedent). 
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promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.9  A statutory 
sentencing enhancement imposes a stiffer mandatory minimum sentence after a 
defendant has committed the requisite predicate acts.10  For example, the 
ACCA provides a mandatory minimum of fifteen years imprisonment if the 
defendant violated the requisite statute three times.11  In sum: 
Various statutes provide for the enhancement of a sentence when certain 
criteria are present.  Such a statute does not create a separate crime.  It sets a 
mandatory minimum sentence, and increases the underlying sentence rather 
than imposing a distinct additional sentence.  The terms “aggravating factors,” 
“enhancing factors,” “sentence enhancement factors,” and “enhancement facts” 
mean the same thing and may be used interchangeably.12 
A federal sentence is calculated via the Guidelines typically by analysis of 
“objective factors such as criminal history, acceptance of responsibility, weight 
of drug in drug cases, etc.  These factors are put into a grid, and a sentence 
within a very limited range is derived.  The Guidelines provide some bases for 
departure, but the specific departures are limited.”13 
The prosecutor has wide latitude to seek a sentence higher than provided in 
the Guidelines, although the sentencing judge retains authority over the final 
sentencing decision.14 
 
 9. The United States Sentencing Commission is: 
An independent commission in the judicial branch of the federal government responsible 
for setting and regulating guidelines for criminal sentencing in federal courts and for 
issuing policy statements about their application.  The President appoints its members 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.  It was created under the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1571–72 (8th ed. 2004). 
 10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 
fifteen years for defendants who violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who have three previous 
convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both). 
 11. The statute provides: 
  In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous 
convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or 
a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such 
person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or 
grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 
922(g). 
Id. 
 12. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2104 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 13. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1433 (Am. Casebook Ser., 8th ed. 2007). 
 14. Id. 
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B. Resentencing is Generally Constitutionally Permissive 
An appellate court has the authority to set aside a sentence and remand the 
case for resentencing if the sentence: 
[W]as imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines . . . [or] is outside the applicable 
guideline range and the district court failed to provide the required statement of 
reasons in the order of judgment and commitment, or the departure is based on 
an impermissible factor, or is to an unreasonable degree, or the sentence was 
imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline 
and is plainly unreasonable . . . .15 
In all other circumstances, the appellate court must affirm the sentence.16 
Additional provisions are available for the district court to immediately 
correct the defendant’s sentence17 or to reduce the defendant’s sentence, upon 
motion by the government, for providing substantial assistance to the 
government.18  A defendant has an absolute right to appeal his or her sentence 
even if the defendant pleaded guilty.19 
It would seem that resentencing violates a defendant’s rights against 
double jeopardy.  It is well-established, however, that multiple sentencing 
hearings do not violate a defendant’s constitutional right against double 
jeopardy.20  The Supreme Court has specifically held that resentencing does 
not implicate double jeopardy concerns unless the defendant has a legitimate 
“expectation of finality in the original sentence.”21  The Eighth Circuit has 
accordingly recognized that resentencing generally does not constitute double 
jeopardy.22  The Eighth Circuit has also explained that “permitting 
resentencing under present federal practice does little if any harm to the 
 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1), (2) (2006).  In this instance, the appellate court must also “state 
specific reasons for its conclusions.”  Id. § 3742(f)(2). 
 16. Id. § 3742(f)(3). 
 17. FED R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (“Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a 
sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”). 
 18. Id. R. 35(b) (“[T]he court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, 
provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.”). 
 19. Id. R. 32(j)(1)(B).  For greater discussion on the interplay between the Sentencing 
Guidelines and downward departures for substantial assistance, see I. India Geronimo, Comment, 
“Reasonably Predictable”: The Reluctance to Embrace Judicial Discretion for Substantial 
Assistance Departures, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321 (2006). 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Alton, 120 F.3d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding the 
district court’s sentence correction); see also United States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that resentencing to impose an enhancement previously barred by a separate 
conviction did not constitute double jeopardy); United States v. Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1115 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (finding no double jeopardy at resentencing because the defendant had no legitimate 
expectation of finality). 
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interests served by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”23  Although the government 
is generally not prohibited from retrying a defendant who has successfully 
appealed his or her first conviction because of some error in the proceedings,24 
“the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial when a conviction is reversed due to 
insufficient evidence, because that decision is functionally equivalent to an 
acquittal.”25  Nevertheless, the courts have been reluctant to apply this holding 
in all situations.26 
C. Limits on Resentencing Permissive 
When setting aside a defendant’s sentence and remanding the case for 
resentencing, an appellate court has the authority to provide “such instructions 
as the court considers appropriate.”27  This power coincides with the power of 
the Supreme Court and appellate courts to, upon lawful review, remand the 
case and mandate additional proceedings as justice may require.28  The Eighth 
Circuit has recognized and examined its authority to limit the district court at 
resentencing: “Once a sentence has been vacated or a finding related to 
sentencing has been reversed and the case has been remanded for resentencing, 
the district court can hear any relevant evidence on that issue that it could have 
heard at the first hearing.”29  The Eighth Circuit has recognized, however, that 
it has “[o]n occasion . . . remanded with instructions to resentence a defendant 
on the existing record because the government, in the first sentencing 
proceeding, violated clearly settled legal principles . . . .”30  Indeed, the court 
has the ability to “remand for resentencing ‘with instructions to resentence the 
defendant on the existing record’”31 in addition to its ability to “remand 
 
 23. Woodall v. United States, 72 F.3d 77, 80 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 24. Id. at 78 (quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988)). 
 25. Id. (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)). 
 26. In Woodall, the Eighth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the bar to 
death penalty sentencing procedures while the Eighth Circuit has applied the bar to Missouri and 
Arkansas habitual offender enhancement statutes; however, the court declined to extend it further.  
Id. at 7879.  The court noted that those statutes “required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all 
essential sentencing facts.”  Id.; see also Harrison v. Gillespie, 596 F.3d 551, 562 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981)) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause 
applies to capital sentencing proceedings that ‘have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or 
innocence.’”). 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2)(A) (2006). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).  The statute further allows the Supreme Court or an appellate 
court to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court 
lawfully brought before it for review.”  Id. 
 29. United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. 
Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 879 (1991)). 
 30. United States v. Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 31. United States v. Kendall, 475 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dunlap, 452 F.3d at 
749). 
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‘without placing any limitations on the district court [in which case it] can hear 
any relevant evidence . . . that it could have heard at the first hearing.’”32  The 
district court must consult the appellate court’s opinion to properly determine 
the applicable scope of remand.33  This inquiry is necessary because “[o]n 
remand for resentencing, all issues decided by the appellate court become the 
law of the case, and the sentencing court is bound to proceed within the scope 
of any limitations imposed . . . by the appellate court.”34 
D. Eighth Circuit Uncertainty 
Although the court’s authority to limit the district court on resentencing is 
well-settled, inconsistent application of that authority led to incompatible, 
irreconcilable results.  A series of cases in the last two decades, while 
recognizing the ability to impose limitations at resentencing, failed to articulate 
a clear standard for limitations and, in some cases, failed to apply any limiting 
standard. 
1. United States v. Cornelius 
In Cornelius, the court contemplated the scope of resentencing after 
remanding the case to the district court for determination of the defendant’s 
status as an armed career criminal based on a breaking and entering 
conviction.35  After a jury convicted the defendant of illegally possessing a 
firearm, the government sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence under the 
ACCA and the career offender enhancement in the Sentencing Guidelines.36  
The district court initially declined to impose the ACCA enhancement because 
the defendant’s prior breaking and entering conviction did not constitute a 
predicate felony under the ACCA.37  The district court did, however, classify 
the defendant as a career offender and sentenced the defendant to ten years 
 
 32. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlap, 452 F.3d at 750); see also United States v. 
Pepper, 570 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the appellate court has “two options: 
(1) [the appellate court] may remand the case with instructions limiting the scope of the district 
court’s discretion, or (2) [the appellate court] may remand without placing any limitations on the 
district court’s discretion”). 
 33. Kendall, 475 F.3d at 964. 
 34. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Curtis, 336 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 
2003)). 
 35. United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 36. Id. at 704; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (stating that a person who has been convicted 
of three previous violent felonies or serious drug offenses will be imprisoned for no less than 
fifteen years for a subsequent conviction); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 
(2009) (defining “career offender” and providing the minimum amount of time a person will be 
imprisoned based on the offense). 
 37. Cornelius, 968 F.2d at 704. 
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imprisonment.38  The government appealed, and the Eighth Circuit found the 
defendant’s prior breaking and entering conviction sufficient under the ACCA, 
remanding the case to the district court for resentencing.39  At resentencing, the 
district court did not allow the defendant to present additional evidence in his 
defense, stating that the Eighth Circuit’s mandate limited the court to 
determine the proper sentence, and sentenced the defendant to thirty years 
imprisonment.40  The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court was 
free to consider additional evidence at resentencing.41 
In contemplating the defendant’s appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that, 
generally, a district court can hear additional relevant evidence at resentencing 
that it could have heard at the first hearing.42  But, the court recognized its 
ability to limit the district court at resentencing: “The sentencing court must, 
however, adhere to any limitations imposed on its function at resentencing by 
the appellate court.”43  The court then examined its earlier mandate and 
acknowledged that it did explicitly hold that the defendant was a career 
offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.44  However, it held that the district 
court erred because the mandate did not state that the defendant was an armed 
career criminal under the ACCA, but rather only stated that the prior breaking 
and entering conviction qualified as a predicate conviction.45 
In sum, Cornelius recognized the Eighth Circuit’s authority to limit the 
scope of resentencing, although there the court did not impose such a 
limitation.46 
2. United States v. Hudson 
In Hudson, the defendant pleaded guilty for conspiring to distribute 
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.47  She 
received a sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with 
her crime, pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 704–05. 
 41. Id. at 705. 
 42. Cornelius, 968 F.2d at 705. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 706. 
 45. Id. at 705–06. 
 46. Id. 
 47. United States v. Hudson, 129 F.3d 994, 994 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) (2006) (outlawing the manufacturing or distribution of controlled substances); id. § 
846 (2006) (stating that anyone who conspires to commit a drug offense can receive the same 
sentence as someone who actually committed it). 
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2D1.1(b)(1).48  The defendant objected to the enhancement and denied that she 
possessed a firearm on the requisite dates.49  The district court denied the 
defendant’s objections and imposed the enhancement.50  The Eighth Circuit 
reversed, explaining that the district court’s finding lacked support in its record 
and was therefore clearly erroneous.51  In remanding the case, the court 
restricted the parties to “the existing sentencing record, with no opportunity for 
either party to reopen or add to that record.”52  The court explained that it 
imposed the restriction “[b]ecause [the court] . . . clearly stated the governing 
principles as to when and how disputed sentencing facts must be 
proved . . . .”53  The court also noted that if the government failed to make 
evidence part of the sentencing record in the district court, then “it may not be 
made part of the sentencing record on remand.”54 
Thus, Hudson is an instance where the Eighth Circuit both recognized and 
applied limitations on the scope of resentencing.  The court grounded its 
holding on the unambiguous requirements at sentencing and the government’s 
lack of a valid excuse for failing to meet those requirements.55 
3. United States v. Poor Bear 
In Poor Bear, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully touching a 
fifteen-year-old female while she was sleeping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2244(a)(2).56  At sentencing, the district court enhanced the defendant’s 
sentence under the Criminal Sexual Abuse provision rather than the Abusive 
Sexual Contact provision, which resulted in a higher sentence.57  The 
government and the defendant had agreed to the Abusive Sexual Contact 
enhancement, and the government did not seek the Criminal Sexual Abuse 
enhancement.58  The presentence report (“PSR”), however, recommended the 
Criminal Sexual Abuse enhancement, and after calling the FBI agent who 
interviewed the defendant to testify, the district court applied the Criminal 
 
 48. Hudson, 129 F.3d at 994; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) 
(1995) (stating that if the accused was in possession of a dangerous weapon when apprehended, 
his or her sentence will be enhanced by two levels). 
 49. Hudson, 129 F.3d at 994. 
 50. Id. at 994–95 (noting that the district court ultimately imposed the enhancement after 
finding that Hudson did possess a firearm in connection with her drug offense). 
 51. Id. at 995. 
 52. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hudson, 129 F.3d at 995 n.1. 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1039 (8th Cir. 2004); see 18 U.S.C. § 
2244(a)(2) (2000) (stating that if someone has unlawful sexual contact with another, that person 
will be fined and/or imprisoned for up to three years). 
 57. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d at 1039–40. 
 58. Id. at 1039. 
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Sexual Abuse enhancement, sentencing the defendant to three years 
imprisonment.59 
The defendant appealed the imposition of the Criminal Sexual Abuse 
enhancement, citing a lack of evidence supporting the enhancement.60  The 
Eighth Circuit found insufficient evidence supporting the enhancement, as the 
only permissive evidence to support the enhancement was the FBI agent’s 
testimony.61  When the Eighth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing, it 
limited the district court to the existing record “without the opportunity to 
reopen or add to the record,” because the sentencing enhancement 
requirements were undisputed, yet the predicate facts were clearly unproven by 
the government at sentencing.62 
In sum, Poor Bear is in accord with Hudson in that the court limited the 
government to the existing record at resentencing because the sentencing 
enhancement requirements were unambiguous, and the government failed to 
meet those requirements.63 
4. United States v. Dunlap64 
In Dunlap, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing 
pseudoephedrine with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine.65  The district court sentenced the defendant for possessing 
27.8 grams of pseudoephedrine, despite the defendant’s objection.66  The 
defendant successfully appealed his sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Booker.67  At resentencing, however, the 
government introduced additional evidence to establish the requisite drug 
quantity, and the district court again imposed the same sentence.68 
The defendant again appealed, this time arguing the government should not 
have been allowed to introduce new evidence at resentencing.69  Because the 
Eighth Circuit gave no limiting instruction to the district court, the government 
 
 59. Id. at 1040. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1041.  Although the PSR contained allegations relevant to the sentencing 
enhancement determination, the PSR cannot be used as evidence.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 
 62. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d at 1043–44. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 452 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 65. United States v. Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747, 748 (8th Cir. 2006).  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  As the court explained, Booker “held that the federal sentencing guidelines did not 
violate the sixth amendment so long as they were applied in an advisory manner.”  Id. at 749; see 
also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 68. Dunlap, 452 F.3d at 748. 
 69. Id. at 748. 
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could present new evidence at resentencing.70  The court noted that the 
government and trial judge had reasonably interpreted the defendant’s 
objections narrowly, so that the government had not been put on notice that it 
would have to put on evidence of quantity at the initial sentencing hearing.71 
Dunlap expanded the prior line of resentencing cases in the Eighth Circuit.  
The court again recognized its authority to limit the resentencing scope, but 
found no such limitations because the court had not expressly imposed them 
and because the government was not sufficiently notified of its evidentiary 
deficiency at the first sentencing hearing.72 
5. United States v. Kendall 
In Kendall, the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing materials necessary 
to manufacture methamphetamine.73  After applying the career offender 
sentencing enhancement, the district court sentenced the defendant to eighty-
four months imprisonment.74  The defendant successfully appealed his 
sentence, but on remand the district court judge again imposed an eighty-four-
month sentence.75  The Eighth Circuit again vacated the defendant’s sentence, 
citing insufficient evidence for the upward variation.76  On remand, the district 
court allowed the government to introduce evidence to establish the 
defendant’s prior disputed D.W.I. offense, classified as a crime of violence, 
thereby supporting the career offender sentencing enhancement.77  The Eighth 
Circuit set no limits defining the scope of resentencing in its mandate.78  The 
defendant again appealed his sentence.79 
 
 70. Id. at 74950. 
 71. Id. at 750.  The court explained: 
Because nothing in our original remand order precluded the government from presenting 
its evidence at resentencing, we cannot say that the district court erred in allowing it to do 
so. 
  We also think that the circumstances at the first sentencing in this case explain the 
government’s failure to present evidence at that time.  Once the court made its tentative 
findings in advance of the sentencing hearing and the defendant did not file a motion in 
opposition to them, the government had no reason to believe that it would be required to 
put on evidence at the sentencing proceeding. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 72. Id. 
 73. United States v. Kendall, 475 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2007).  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6).  Id. 
 74. Id.  The sentencing enhancement was pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual Section 4B1.1.  Id. 
 75. Id.  The Eighth Circuit overturned the defendant’s sentence in light of recent cases in 
which the court held a D.W.I. offense was not a crime of violence.  Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 963. 
 78. Kendall, 475 F.3d at 963. 
 79. Id. 
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In affirming the sentence, the Eighth Circuit explained there was 
insufficient information to determine whether the defendant’s crime was a 
violent crime and additional information was, therefore, necessary.80  The 
Eighth Circuit also reasoned that it had not placed any “express limitations” on 
the district court’s ability to consider evidence relevant to determining whether 
the defendant’s crime was a crime of violence.81 
Kendall, therefore, again recognized the court’s ability to place limitations 
on the scope of resentencing, but as in Cornelius, the court did not impose any 
such limitations.82  Additional evidence was also necessary in Kendall to 
determine whether the defendant’s conviction satisfied the enhancement 
requirements.83 
6. United States v. Viezcas-Soto 
In Viezcas-Soto, the defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after 
unlawfully reentering the United States following deportation.84  The district 
court enhanced the defendant’s sentence based on a prior unlawful sexual 
intercourse conviction in California.85  The defendant appealed the imposition 
of the enhancement, arguing that his prior offense was not a violent felony, as 
required by the statutory enhancement.86  The majority ultimately concluded 
that the district court improperly classified the prior conviction as a violent 
felony; therefore, it improperly applied the sentencing enhancement.87  The 
majority then remanded the case for resentencing.88 
In his dissent, Judge Gruender argued that the defendant’s prior conviction 
was indeed a violent felony and that the court should affirm.89  Judge Gruender 
concluded by noting that at resentencing, the district court would be allowed to 
hear any additional evidence regarding the classification of a prior crime that it 
could have heard at the first sentencing hearing.90  Judge Gruender relied on 
 
 80. Id. at 964. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. See Kendall, 475 F.3d at 964. 
 83. Id. 
 84. United States v. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 906.  The enhancement was pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
Section  2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).  Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 908. 
 89. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d at 916 (Gruender, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 916 n.11 (“With respect to the scope of the resentencing proceeding that the Court 
has ordered, I note that the district court is free to consider additional evidence that may 
conclusively resolve the question whether [the defendant’s] prior conviction for violating 
California’s statutory rape law qualifies as a felony.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1444 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1433 
the majority’s failure to place any express limitations on the district court at 
resentencing.91 
Although the discussion on the scope of resentencing is limited to a 
footnote in the dissent, Viezcas-Soto is another example of inconsistent 
application of the Eighth Circuit’s resentencing standard.92  No discussion was 
given in the majority’s opinion as to the resentencing scope, and therefore, the 
default of no limitations was applied.93 
As the above cases illustrate, the Eighth Circuit recognized and analyzed 
the resentencing scope issue but failed to articulate and consistently apply a 
governing standard.  At the outer limits, when no express limitations are 
imposed, no limitations are inferred.94  In cases where the record is clearly 
established, the court may be more inclined to impose limitations.95  In cases 
where the record is less certain, the court may be less likely to place 
restrictions on the scope at resentencing.96  An additional inquiry underlies this 
determination: whether the defendant or the district court sufficiently put the 
government on notice of its sentencing obligations.97 
II.  EIGHTH CIRCUIT ARTICULATES RULE OF RESTRICTION 
In United States v. Gammage,98 the Eighth Circuit received another 
opportunity to limit the scope of resentencing on remand.99  It found that the 
district court committed an error at sentencing.100  Unlike in the 
aforementioned cases, the court in Gammage placed express limitations on the 
government at resentencing and thoroughly explained its reasoning.101 
A. Background Facts 
The government tried, and the jury convicted, Mr. Gammage of illegally 
possessing a firearm after he had previously been convicted of domestic 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 36–88. 
 93. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d at 905–08 (majority opinion). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Kendall, 475 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing no 
limitations because the court had not imposed any express limitations on the district court). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1043–44 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that resentencing must be conducted on the existing sentencing record without the opportunity to 
reopen or add to the record). 
 96. See, e.g., Kendall, 475 F.3d at 964 (implying that courts tend not to place restrictions 
where there is ambiguity in the record). 
 97. See United States v. Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 98. 580 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 99. Id. at 778–79. 
 100. Id. at 778–79. 
 101. Id. at 779–80. 
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violence.102  At sentencing, the government sought to enhance Mr. Gammage’s 
sentence based on his alleged three previous convictions of burglary.103  The 
government introduced commitment orders104 to establish two of the burglary 
convictions, both burglaries of houses, but introduced only the indictment for 
the third conviction, which alleged burglary of a pawn shop.105  Despite Mr. 
Gammage’s objection to the sufficiency of the evidence of the third conviction 
for enhancement, the district court granted the enhancement and sentenced Mr. 
Gammage to 180 months imprisonment.106 
B. The District Court Incorrectly Applied the Sentencing Enhancement 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the government only 
introduced the indictment to prove the third conviction, and “an indictment is 
simply an accusation.  It is not evidence of anything.”107  Thus, the indictment, 
standing alone, was insufficient to prove the third conviction.108  The 
government tried to supplement the record with a copy of the commitment 
order for the alleged third conviction.109  The government claimed that it had 
presented a copy of the commitment order to the district court judge in 
chambers.110  But any such meeting was off the record, and the district court 
judge could not attest to the presence of the commitment order during any 
meeting.111  Finally, the government argued that Mr. Gammage did not object 
to the PSR, which detailed the facts surrounding his alleged third conviction 
and would support the necessary third conviction for the enhancement.112  
Even though Mr. Gammage did not object to the PSR, he did object to the 
conviction itself.113  Therefore, the court determined that the government had 
failed to meet its burden and that the district court improperly applied the 
enhancement.114 
 
 102. Id. at 778.  This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). 
 103. The enhancement sought was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).  Gammage, 580 
F.3d at 778. 
 104. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “commitment document” as: “An order remanding a 
defendant to prison in order to carry out a judgment and sentence.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
289 (8th ed. 2004). 
 105. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 778. 
 106. Id. at 778–79. 
 107. Id. at 779 (quoting EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
CRIMINAL § 1.01 (2009)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 778–79. 
 110. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 778–79. 
 111. Id. at 779. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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C. Limited Scope on Remand 
The Eighth Circuit limited the government to the existing record on 
remand.115  This effectively meant that there would be no enhancement 
because the existing record was insufficient to support the enhancement.116 
Writing for the court, Judge Arnold reasoned that because the government 
was on notice that it needed to prove Mr. Gammage’s convictions to apply the 
enhancement and failed to do so, the government should be limited to the 
existing record on remand.117  The court further explained that “[t]here were no 
arcane legal principles involved in this case, and the district court committed 
no legal error that misled the government or deflected it from introducing its 
evidence.”118  Finally, the court also relied on the fact that Mr. Gammage’s 
attorney specifically objected to the indictment being used to prove the 
conviction.119  The court recognized the higher standard involved here because 
the government committed an error in a criminal case.120  The court also 
recognized that “[t]he law, from considerations of efficiency and fairness, does 
not generally favor do-overs, as various estoppel doctrines like res judicata 
and double jeopardy attest.”121  The court concluded that the government 
should not get “a second bite at the apple.”122 
III.  UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
Although the court discussed extensively its decision to limit the 
government, the scope is still somewhat blurry.  One could interpret the 
holding to be limited only to cases in which the defendant specifically objected 
to the sufficiency of the evidence for the enhancement at sentencing.  The 
holding also may not apply in more complex cases, such as those where the 
district court significantly contributed to the error or where the government is 
misled or deceived.  At the same time, the court’s rationale of double jeopardy 
and res judicata extend beyond those cases. 
A. Double Jeopardy 
The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that: “No person shall . . . 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
 
 115. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779. 
 116. See id. at 779. 
 117. Id. at 779–80. 
 118. Id. at 779. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779–80. 
 121. Id. at 780. 
 122. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
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limb . . . .”123  Double jeopardy is, more concretely, “[t]he fact of being 
prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense.”124 
In Green v. United States,125 the Supreme Court articulated principles 
surrounding the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
he may be found guilty.126 
Although the Court was examining the permissibility of a second trial 
following a conviction and successful appeal,127 the applicability of these 
concepts is far-reaching.  Even though Gammage involved multiple sentencing 
hearings, rather than multiple trials, these concerns were generally articulated 
by the Eighth Circuit in its holding.128  Although these concerns may be 
mitigated in the context of multiple sentencing hearings, their effects are still 
significant. 
B. Res Judicata 
Although not entirely dispositive of the government’s ability to present 
additional evidence at resentencing, res judicata embodies the concepts of 
finality and efficiency: 
[R]es judicata is [the] principle inherent in all judicial systems which provides 
that “an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or 
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, 
questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other 
actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.”129 
 
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 124. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (8th ed. 2004). 
 125. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
 126. Id. at 187–88. 
 127. Id. at 190.  In Green, the defendant was initially charged with first-degree murder but 
was convicted of second-degree murder.  Id. at 189–90.  After a successful appeal, the defendant 
was again tried and found guilty, but of first-degree murder.  Id. at 186.  The defendant claimed 
double jeopardy barred this conviction, while the government contended that the defendant had 
waived his right to claim double jeopardy when he appealed his lesser conviction.  Id. at 187, 
191.  The court found that because the defendant had already “run the gauntlet” of being found 
guilty of first-degree murder, the jury’s acquittal of that charge barred subsequent trials for first-
degree murder.  Id. at 190. 
 128. See United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 129. WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 1 (1988) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Not only does res judicata bar relitigation of issues that were argued in the first 
case, “but also those claims and causes of action that could have been raised 
and decided in the first case.”130  Res judicata “is non-discretionary in nature 
because without res judicata the judgment lacks conclusiveness and essential 
finality.”131 
In the context of multiple sentencing hearings, res judicata would serve as 
a bar to the presentation of additional evidence not offered at the first hearing 
but used to argue an issue litigated at the first hearing.  In effect, allowing 
additional evidence undermines the principle of res judicata, as such actions 
subvert the functions of finality and conclusiveness of determinations formed 
at the first sentencing hearing. 
C. Judicial Economy 
Federal courts experienced an increasingly large workload in the beginning 
of the twenty-first century.132  The Eighth Circuit recognized that “[r]epetitive 
hearings, followed by additional appeals . . . waste judicial resources and place 
additional burdens on parole officers and personnel and on hardworking 
district and appellate judges.”133  What could be more repetitive than the 
following sequence: a criminal trial, followed by a conviction, followed by a 
sentencing hearing in which the government fails to meet its burden yet a 
sentencing enhancement is imposed, followed by a successful appeal by the 
defendant, followed by another sentencing hearing which is identical to the 
first sentencing hearing except at this hearing the government submits 
sufficient evidence to support its contentions, followed by additional appeals?  
By providing a clear schema for courts to follow when the government fails to 
meet its burden at sentencing, the Eighth Circuit has saved invaluable judicial 
resources.  Simply put, by mandating that the government treat the first 
sentencing hearing as if it was the government’s only opportunity to present 
evidence, the Eighth Circuit has reduced the number of repetitive hearings and 
ensured a greater number of proper sentences. 
 
 130. Id. at 5. 
 131. Id. at 4–5. 
 132. Heather Rickenbrode, Expanding the Docket: The Fifth Circuit Disregards Judicial 
Economy in Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co., 77 TUL. L. REV. 1453, 1461–62 (2003) 
(citing Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 687 (2001)). 
 133. United States v. Kendall, 475 F.3d 961, 963–64 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Santonelli, 128 F.3d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir. 1997)).  The court went further, adding that “[s]pecific 
remands should be used to eliminate the need for additional appeals . . . .”  Id. at 964 (citing 
Santonelli, 128 F.3d at 1238–39). 
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D. Collateral Estoppel 
Collateral estoppel embodies many of the principles reflected in res 
judicata.  Indeed, collateral estoppel “has the same general objective as res 
judicata, to wit: finality of litigation.”134  Collateral estoppel holds that “[w]hen 
an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination 
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same 
or a different claim.”135 
As with res judicata, allowing additional evidence at subsequent 
sentencing hearings undermines the principles of collateral estoppel.  As the 
disputed issue was litigated and a judgment was found in the first sentencing 
hearing, allowing, in effect, a de novo rehearing voids the first, lawful 
judgment, possibly to the defendant’s detriment. 
IV.  CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While many circuits maintain rules of resentencing limitation, some 
circuits have not confronted or discussed the issue.  Adding to the confusion is 
the Ninth Circuit, which confronted and thoroughly discussed the issue yet 
explicitly declined to adopt a limiting provision.136 
A. Majority has Adopted Limited Scope at Resentencing 
Nearly all the circuits that addressed the scope of resentencing issue have 
come to results similar to Gammage, although few have given extended 
discussion.137  The rationale present in these holdings generally mirrors that of 
Gammage.138 
1. Third Circuit—United States v. Dickler139 
In Dickler, the defendants pleaded guilty to impeding the functions of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1032(2).140  There, 
 
 134. FREEDMAN, supra note 129, at 1. 
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 136. United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 887 (stating the two Eighth Circuit cases on which the Matthews 
defendant relied provided little in the way of analysis). 
 138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 139. 64 F.3d 818 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 140. United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 820–21 (3d Cir. 1995).  18 U.S.C. § 1032(2) 
reads: 
  Whoever corruptly impedes or endeavors to impede the functions of [the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, acting as conservator or receiver or in the Corporation’s 
corporate capacity with respect to any asset acquired or liability assumed by the 
Corporation under section 11, 12, or 13 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, any conservator appointed by the Comptroller of the 
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the defendants operated an automotive repossession business, as well as a used 
automobile dealership.141  The defendants entered into an agreement with two 
federally insured lenders, and the Resolution Trust Corporation became the 
conservator of one of the federally insured lenders.142  Under the terms of the 
agreement, the defendants were required, upon repossession of an automobile, 
to solicit three bids for the car and send the bids to the lenders, who would 
either accept the bid or reject the bid and sell the car at auction.143  The 
defendants, rather than following the agreement, submitted false bids for 
automobiles in order to repair and resell the automobiles for a profit.144 
At sentencing, the dispute centered on the application of a sentencing 
enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2F1.1 for a 
loss more than $120,000.145  In an extended discussion, the Third Circuit 
determined that the loss calculation applied by the district court was improper 
and remanded the case for resentencing.146 
The court then contemplated the scope of resentencing on remand.147  The 
court chose to allow the district court to consider additional evidence and 
arguments regarding the loss calculation.148  In doing so, the court recognized 
that “where the government has the burden of production and persuasion . . . 
[i]ts case should ordinarily have to stand or fall on the record it makes the first 
time around.  It should not normally be afforded a second bite at the apple.”149  
Here, however, the court determined that fairness dictated that the government 
have no limits at resentencing:150 
Where, as here, the government believes that it is not feasible to estimate 
the victim’s loss and its evidence, in the absence of the defendant’s evidence, 
would support a finding to that effect, it will frequently not be fair to expect 
the government to be prepared with evidence concerning any theory of loss 
calculation the defendant may advance at the sentencing hearing.  If the 
 
Currency or the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, or the National Credit Union 
Administration Board, acting as conservator or liquidating agent] . . . shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
 141. Dickler, 64 F.3d at 820. 
 142. Id. at 820–21. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 821. 
 145. Id. at 822. 
 146. Dickler, 64 F.3d at 831. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (stating that “[w]e do not preclude the district court from permitting further 
development of the record and leave that for resolution by an exercise of the district court’s 
informed decision”). 
 149. Id. at 832 (quoting United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 150. Id.  The court stated that it saw “no constitutional or statutory impediment to the district 
court’s providing the government with an additional opportunity to present evidence on remand if 
it has tendered a persuasive reason why fairness so requires.”  Id. 
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government, for want of notice or any other reason beyond its control, does not 
have a fair opportunity to fully counter the defendant’s evidence and the 
government’s theory does not carry the day, the district court is entitled to 
permit further record development on remand.151 
The court then deferred to the district court to determine whether the 
government should be permitted to submit additional evidence at 
resentencing.152 
2. Fourth Circuit—United States v. Parker 
In Parker, the Fourth Circuit found that the government failed to present 
evidence necessary for a conviction and sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a).153  
Specifically, the defendant claimed that the government failed to prove that he 
distributed drugs near a “playground” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 
860(e)(1).154  Even viewing the defendant’s challenge of the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the government,155 the Fourth Circuit 
found insufficient evidence to support the enhancement.156  The only evidence 
offered by the government to establish the presence of a playground was a 
vague inference contained in the defendant’s testimony.157 
 
 151. Dickler, 64 F.3d at 832. 
 152. Id.  The court explained: 
  By making these observations, we do not suggest that the government should or 
should not be permitted to offer further evidence in this case on remand.  The district 
court is in a far better position than we to assess the situation in light of the circumstances 
surrounding the original sentencing hearing. 
Id. 
 153. United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 1994).  21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006) 
provides an increased penalty of “twice the maximum punishment” as the punishment provided in 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006), which provides penalties for knowingly or intentionally distributing a 
controlled substance, as set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2009). 
 154. 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1) (2006) reads: “The term ‘playground’ means any outdoor facility 
(including any parking lot appurtenant thereto) intended for recreation, open to the public, and 
with any portion thereof containing three or more separate apparatus intended for the recreation 
of children including, but not limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards.”  The Parker 
Court recognized the statute as demanding four separate requirements be proven for the 
enhancement to apply, the last of which, “containing three or more separate apparatus intended 
for the recreation of children,” was disputed.  Parker, 30 F.3d at 552. 
 155. Parker, 30 F.3d at 551–52. 
 156. Id. at 553. 
 157. The government contended that the jury could have inferred from the defendant’s 
references in his testimony that the park where he distributed cocaine base (“crack”) “had at least 
two separate baskets and a blacktop where kids could play hopscotch as well as other games.”  Id. 
at 552.  The government argued that “the two baskets plus the one blacktop constitute the 
requisite ‘three or more separate apparatus.’”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1452 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1433 
The Fourth Circuit then contemplated how the case should be handled on 
remand.158  Based on its earlier ruling, the court entered the defendant’s total 
offense level and guidelines imprisonment range.159  Given the court’s ruling, 
the government sought imposition of a similar sentencing enhancement.160  
The court, however, declined to institute the enhancement, given the 
government’s evidentiary failures:161 
[T]he prosecution has already been given one full and fair opportunity to offer 
whatever proof about [the park] it could assemble.  Having failed to seize that 
opportunity, the [g]overnment at resentencing should not be allowed to 
introduce additional evidence to prove that [the park] contained a playground.  
One bite at the apple is enough.162 
The court accordingly reversed the defendant’s conviction and sentence under 
21 U.S.C. § 860 and remanded the case to the district court to resentence the 
defendant only under 21 U.S.C. § 841.163 
3. Sixth Circuit—United States v. Gill 
In Gill, the Sixth Circuit overturned the defendant’s sentence due to an 
improper calculation of drug quantities and application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.164  At sentencing, the government sought an enhancement for the 
defendant’s distribution of drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),165 
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2D1.1(c)(13).166  The 
government based its argument on statements made by the defendant and 
contained in the PSR that the defendant purchased and resold drugs to fuel his 
drug habit, even though those drugs were not found on the defendant’s 
person.167  The district court agreed that this was “relevant conduct” for the 
purposes of sentencing, and imposed the sentence accordingly.168 
 
 158. Id. at 553. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Parker, 30 F.3d at 553.  The government sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2D1.2(a)(1), which provides for a two-
level enhancement if the drug offense involved “a protected location or an underage or pregnant 
individual.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.2(a)(1) (1994). 
 161. Parker, 30 F.3d at 553. 
 162. Id. at 553–54. 
 163. Id. at 554. 
 164. United States v. Gill, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 165. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 
 166. Gill, 348 F.3d at 150.  The defendant specifically argued that the district court 
improperly calculated his base offense level, provided under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL Section 2D1.1(c)(13) (2003).  Gill, 348 F.3d at 150. 
 167. Gill, 348 F.3d at 150.  The defendant stated that “for the five weeks preceding his arrest 
on the instant offense, he would buy approximately one-quarter ounce of ‘soft’ (powdered 
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The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to show that 
the defendant had the requisite intent to distribute the drugs.169  The defendant 
argued that he used a portion of the drugs for personal use, and the government 
did not offer any contrary evidence.170  The district court judge improperly 
concluded that, because the defendant intended to distribute at least some of 
the drugs, he should be held responsible for intending to distribute all of the 
drugs.171  In remanding the case for resentencing, the Sixth Circuit limited the 
case to the existing record, thereby foreclosing an opportunity for the 
government to put on evidence showing the defendant’s intent to distribute.172  
The court reasoned that “[t]he government was entitled to only one opportunity 
to present evidence on this issue.”173 
4. Seventh Circuit—United States v. Wyss 
The Seventh Circuit has also confronted the scope of the resentencing 
issue.174  Writing for the majority, Judge Posner limited the government at 
resentencing after it had failed to meet its evidentiary burden for a sentencing 
enhancement.175  A jury convicted the defendant of possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),176 and the judge 
enhanced the defendant’s sentence due to the defendant’s “purchase of cocaine 
for his personal consumption, rather than for sale.”177  The Seventh Circuit 
noted, however, that “[p]ossession of illegal drugs for personal use cannot be 
grouped with other offenses.”178  Accordingly, it was incorrect for the district 
 
cocaine) and would sell out of that quantity to make a profit.”  Id.  The probation officer 
calculated one-quarter ounce of the drugs, multiplied by five weeks, which yielded 35.4375 
grams and resulted in a base offense level of 14.  Id. 
 168. Id. at 151. 
 169. Id. at 156. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 150–51.  The district court judge reasoned: 
[W]e’d end up with a situation in every case where a drug dealer caught up with a big bag 
of dope, all he’s got to do is say, “Well, I had bought this as my private stash, and I was 
going to use a gram a week for the next six years,” and it gets impossible to determine. 
Id. at 151. 
 172. Gill, 348 F.3d at 156. 
 173. Id. (quoting United States v. Wyss, 147 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 174. See Wyss, 147 F.3d 631. 
 175. Id. at 633. 
 176. The court noted that the defendant was convicted of additional crimes, which the court 
explained were “irrelevant to [the] appeal.”  Id. at 632 (internal citation omitted). 
 177. Id.  This conduct was used to enhance the defendant’s sentence via U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual Section 1B1.3(a)(2) (2003), which allows the district court to consider other 
relevant conduct, if it was part of the same course of conduct, in promulgating the defendant’s 
sentence.  Wyss, 147 F.3d at 632. 
 178. Wyss, 147 F.3d at 632. 
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court to consider the conduct in sentencing the defendant.179  Because the 
government did not prove the quantity of drugs involved180 and offered no 
evidence to rebut the defendant’s testimony that he personally used at least half 
of the drugs he bought, the district court committed an error.181 
The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
resentencing.182  On remand, the district court could not conclude that the use 
of more than half of the cocaine was relevant conduct to the defendant’s 
conviction.183  The court reasoned that “[t]he government was entitled to only 
one opportunity to present evidence on the issue.”184 
5. Tenth Circuit—United States v. Campbell 
In Campbell, the defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a 
firearm.185  At sentencing, the district court considered a sentencing 
enhancement via U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) 
for possessing eight firearms.186  The defendant objected to the enhancement 
because the indictment only claimed possession of seven firearms, one below 
the requisite number for the sentencing enhancement.187  In lieu of seeking 
additional time to gather evidence to prove that the eighth firearm traveled in 
interstate commerce, the government argued that the possession of the eighth 
firearm was relevant conduct under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
Section 1B1.3.188  The district court agreed and applied the four-level 
enhancement.189 
 
 179. Id.  The court also noted that the result “would be different . . . if the charge were 
conspiracy rather than possession.”  Id. 
 180. Id. at 633 (“[T]he burden is on the government to prove the amount of drugs involved in 
that conduct.”). 
 181. Id.  The court specifically declined to decide how to resolve a circumstance where “the 
defendant buys drugs both for his own consumption and for resale . . . [and says] to the 
government, ‘I’m an addict, so prove how much of the cocaine that I bought I kept for my own 
use rather than to resell.’”  Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Wyss, 174 F.3d at 633. 
 184. Id. 
 185. United States v. Campbell, 372 F.3d 1179, 1180 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1) (2006) (criminalizing possession of a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce 
by one who has been convicted of a crime punishable by over one year of imprisonment); id. § 
924(a)(2)  (corresponding punishment). 
 186. Campbell, 372 F.3d at 1181.  The district court relied on the PSR, which calculated the 
defendant’s base offense level at twenty-two pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
Section 2K2.1(a)(3).  Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) (2010) 
(providing for a four-level enhancement for possessing eight to twenty-four firearms illegally). 
 187. Campbell, 372 F.3d at 1181. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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On appeal, the government conceded that the district court erred in 
applying the sentence because the government did not prove that the eighth 
firearm traveled in interstate commerce.190  The Tenth Circuit reversed the 
judgment and remanded the case for resentencing.191 
The government, however, sought to have the appellate court remand for 
de novo sentencing so that it could proffer additional evidence to prove the 
requisite interstate nexus for the eighth rifle.192  The Tenth Circuit denied the 
government’s request: “The government failed to meet its burden of proof on 
the clearly established element of interstate nexus . . . .”193  The court further 
explained that although the “[d]efendant alerted the government to the 
deficiency in its evidence, the government did not seek to cure the deficiency, 
and instead made patently erroneous legal arguments as to why such proof was 
not needed.”194  Finally, the court declared that its decision “[did] not invite an 
open season for the government to make the record that it failed to make in the 
first instance.”195 
6. D.C. Circuit—United States v. Leonzo 
In Leonzo, a defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud stemming from his 
mortgage to refinance his home.196 After the first lender was declared 
insolvent, it was placed in receivership of the Resolution Trust Corporation.197  
The Resolution Trust Corporation subsequently put the loan in a portfolio with 
other non-performing loans, and sold the portfolio at auction.198  The portfolio 
sold at auction for only 60.5% of the total principal balance.199 
At sentencing, the government sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence 
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), which 
provides an additional enhancement for actual losses over $120,000.200  To 
prove the requisite loss,201 the government successfully argued that the 60.5% 
sale price of the portfolio proved a 39.5% loss on the defendant’s loan, thereby 
 
 190. Id. at 1182. 
 191. Id. at 1183. 
 192. Campbell, 372 F.3d at 1183. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 195. Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 182 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 196. United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to conspiring to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  The district court also imposed an enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual Section 2F1.1(b)(1)(G) for actual losses exceeding $70,000, and the defendant 
did not challenge this enhancement.  Id. 
 201. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1087–88 (“The government bears the burden of establishing ‘loss’ 
under § 2F1.1 by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
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establishing the $120,000 requirement of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual Section 2F1.1(b)(1)(H).202  The D.C. Circuit held, however, that the 
60.5% auction price of the portfolio was insufficient to prove a 39.5% loss on 
the sale of the defendant’s loan.203 
Having found error, the court next specifically addressed whether on 
remand the government could proffer additional evidence to support its claim 
of a loss on the defendant’s loan exceeding $41,000, which would carry the 
total loss over $120,000.204  The court saw “no reason why [the government] 
should get a second bite at the apple,” given that “[t]he government had the 
burdens of production and persuasion.”205  The court further reasoned that 
“[n]o special circumstances justified, or even explained, the government’s 
failure to sustain these burdens [of production and persuasion].”206  The court 
accordingly remanded the case on the existing record, foreclosing the 
possibility of a sentencing enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual Section 2F1.1(b)(1)(H).207 
B. Ninth Circuit Refuses to Adopt 
Despite the strong support found in other circuits to limit scope on remand, 
the Ninth Circuit has intentionally refused to apply such limits.208  In United 
States v. Matthews,209 the court gave significant discussion to the scope on 
resentencing issue.210  Although a three-judge panel limited the government to 
the existing record on remand for resentencing (“Matthews I”),211 the court 
reheard the case en banc, and declined to implement such a rule (“Matthews 
II”).212 
 
 202. Id. at 1087. 
 203. Id. at 1088.  The court equated the government’s argument to trying to accurately 
determine “the verbal SAT score of a specific high school student from information that her class 
averaged 615 on the verbal SAT.”  Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Leonzo, 50 F.3d at 1088. 
 207. Id.  The court also noted that the remaining six-point enhancement under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2F1.1(b)(G) would remain in place because the evidence 
supported that loss calculation without the disputed evidence.  Id. 
 208. United States v. Matthews (Matthews II), 278 F.3d 880, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 209. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 880; United States v. Matthews (Matthews I), 240 F.3d 806 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 210. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 880, 885–90; Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 821–22. 
 211. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 821–22. 
 212. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 882. 
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1. Matthews I 
In Matthews I, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully possessing a 
firearm.213  The PSI recommended enhancing the defendant’s sentence under 
the ACCA due to three prior violent felony convictions.214  The defendant 
objected to the imposition of the sentencing enhancement, arguing that there 
was no evidence that the prior convictions used force, threat of force, or 
weapons, and therefore, could not be used to satisfy the ACCA 
requirements.215  The defendant also objected in writing and at the sentencing 
hearing to the application of the sentencing enhancement in the absence of 
certified copies of the prior felony convictions.216  Even though the 
government offered no additional evidence to support it, the district court 
imposed the sentencing enhancement.217 
A three-judge panel heard the defendant’s appeal, where the defendant 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of the prior convictions.218  The 
court concluded that the district court erred in enhancing the defendant’s 
sentence because the government failed to provide conviction records for the 
predicate judgments.219  The court explained that when a defendant challenges 
previous convictions used as sentencing enhancements, “the court must 
examine the statutes of conviction or certified copies of conviction before 
imposing the enhancement.”220  The district court’s failure to properly 
investigate the prior convictions constituted an error of law.221  The court 
 
 213. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 814; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).  The defendant was 
convicted of three counts of unlawfully possessing a firearm, but the district court dismissed two 
of the three counts as multiplicitous.  Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 814. 
 214. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 814. 
 215. Id.  For the sentencing enhancement to apply, the defendant must have at least three prior 
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).  The 
statute further defines “violent felony” as 
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another; or is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 216. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 814.  According to the court, at the sentencing hearing defense 
counsel stated that “the defense would contend that you would have to have certified copies of 
these judgments of conviction.  I believe this Court does not have certified copies of these 
documents.”  Id. at 820. 
 217. Id. at 814. 
 218. Id. at 819–22. 
 219. Id. at 821. 
 220. Id. at 821. 
 221. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 821. 
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accordingly vacated the imposition of the sentencing enhancement and limited 
the government to the existing record at resentencing.222 
The court reasoned that “[t]he government should have been aware of what 
it was required to introduce to meet its burden . . . and it patently failed to 
comply with a critical requirement.”223  The court then “agree[d] with many of 
[its] sister circuits that a party should not be able to do on remand what it has 
no excuse for failing to do the first time around”224 and referenced a number of 
opinions from other circuits.225  Relying on the fact that the defendant clearly 
objected to the lack of supporting evidence, and the government did nothing to 
remedy the problem,226 the court held that “the government [did] not deserve a 
second bite of the apple.”227  The court further reasoned that additional, 
lengthy proceedings would waste judicial resources, and the government 
should have been more thoroughly prepared at the original proceeding.228 
Although the court articulated a broad rule of restriction, it did outline 
certain boundaries for future cases which reflect the court’s reasoning: 
We do not suggest that in all cases where the government’s proof has failed the 
court must always resentence without reopening the record.  In those cases 
where the government demonstrates a persuasive reason why fairness so 
requires, this court has the discretion to permit the government to introduce the 
omitted evidence on remand; where the record is unclear, we may remand with 
instructions to the district court to permit the government to supplement the 
record only if it makes the requisite persuasive showing in the district court.229 
The court determined that the boundaries were not present in the case at bar 
and reversed the imposition of the sentencing enhancement with instructions to 
the district court to resentence based on the existing record.230 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 224. Id. 
 225. The court specifically relied on United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
1995); United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 553–54 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dickler, 64 
F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Monroe, 978 F.2d 433, 435–36 (8th Cir. 1992).  
See Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 821. 
 226. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 821 (“The defendant made patently clear to the district court and 
the government what our precedents require.  The government did not seek to cure the 
deficiencies in its proof.”). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
To allow the government to reopen proceedings at this stage would be to waste court 
resources.  Parties before district courts are obliged to prepare their cases in a thorough 
manner.  When a party’s initial victory is reversed by the appellate court because the party 
failed to meet this obligation, we are obliged to bring to an end the wasteful process. 
Id. 
 229. Id. at 822. 
 230. Id. 
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The panel’s holding was not unanimous; Judge O’Scannlain concurred in 
part and dissented in part and gave extended discussion of the resentencing 
issue in the panel’s amended opinion.231  Judge O’Scannlain disagreed with the 
majority’s determination that the statutory requirements were unambiguous 
and believed the majority had “oversimplified matters greatly.”232  Judge 
O’Scannlain also criticized the majority’s “new exception to its new rule” 
because it would “provide little guidance to future panels, and little comfort to 
those of us who seek predictability and consistency in sentencing.”233  Finally, 
Judge O’Scannlain found the end result to be disconcerting, believing that the 
majority’s rule undermined the statute’s purpose.234  In sum, the defendant 
should not have been permitted to escape harsher sentencing:235 
The process of criminal sentencing is not a game between the government 
and criminal defendants, in which one side or the other gets penalized for 
unskillful play.  The goal of sentencing is to determine the most appropriate 
sentence in light of the characteristics of the crime and the defendant.  If 
Matthews is an “armed career criminal” under the ACC statute (and the record 
makes clear that he is), then he should be sentenced as one.  Because I cannot 
agree to bestowing a sentencing windfall upon a defendant with a long and 
extensive history of committing violent crimes, especially when equally 
culpable but less fortunate defendants have been subjected to the enhancement, 
I must respectfully dissent.236 
2. Matthews II 
The Matthews I majority did not stand for long.  Four months later, the 
Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc.237  Upon rehearing, the en 
banc court reversed the three-judge panel’s decision to limit the government on 
resentencing.238 
 
 231. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 822 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 823.  Judge O’Scannlain explained that “more careful examination of the issue 
discloses that these principles are quite complex, have spawned a great deal of litigation in the 
lower courts, and are far from ‘clearly stated.’”  Id. 
 233. Id.  Judge O’Scannlain described the majority’s holding as a “case by case approach.”  
Id. 
 234. Id.  (“This case by case approach contradicts the goals of both the ACC enhancement 
and the Sentencing Guidelines: The ACC enhancement was enacted in order to provide 
mandatory minimum sentences for armed career criminals.  The Sentencing Guidelines were 
established in large part to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities.”) (citations omitted). 
 235. Id. (“In allowing Matthews to escape imposition of the ACC enhancement simply 
because of the fortuity (from Matthews’s perspective) that his probation officer prepared a less-
than-complete PSR, the majority flouts congressional intent with respect to both the ACC 
enhancement and the Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
 236. Matthews I, 240 F.3d at 823 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 237. United States v. Matthews (Matthews I), 254 F.3d 825, 825 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 238. United States v. Matthews (Matthews II), 278 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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As an initial matter, the court unequivocally concurred with the panel’s 
earlier conclusion that the district court improperly applied the sentencing 
enhancement.239  But the court disagreed with the panel’s decision to limit the 
government at resentencing.240  The court began by outlining its general rule 
regarding resentencing: “[A]s a general matter, if a district court errs in 
sentencing, we will remand for resentencing on an open record—that is, 
without limitation on the evidence that the district court may consider.”241  The 
government is, therefore, authorized to submit any evidence that it could have 
submitted at the first sentencing, as the district court is in effect conducting a 
de novo sentencing hearing.242  The court reasoned that such a rule “furthers 
the goals of ‘predictability and consistency in sentencing,’ because it allows 
for the fullest development of the evidence relevant to a just sentence”243 and is 
consistent with prior Ninth Circuit precedent.244  The court recognized a 
number of cases in which it did limit the scope of resentencing, when either 
“additional evidence would not have changed the outcome,” or “there was a 
failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue.”245  The 
court concluded that neither of those circumstances were present in the case at 
bar.246 
The court then turned its discussion to the out-of-circuit precedent on 
which the panel relied.247  In dismissing these other holdings,248 the court 
analyzed each case in turn.  First, the court found its decision consistent with 
the Third Circuit’s holding in United States v. Dickler because there the Third 
 
 239. Id. at 884. 
 240. Id. at 885. 
 241. Id. (citing United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 242. Id. at 885–86. 
 243. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 886 (quoting United States v. Matthews (Matthews I), 240 F.3d 
806, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)). 
 244. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez, 232 F.3d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Standard, 207 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76, 80 (9th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez, 94 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 
1514, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). 
 245. Id. (citing United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 95, 909 (9th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d 1481, 1484 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 246. Id. at 887. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 887.  The court explained: 
In addition, the out-of-circuit cases that Matthews cites do not warrant a departure from 
our general practice.  These cases do not persuade us to adopt a different general rule, 
because they either support our position or offer little helpful analysis to support any 
general limit on the district court’s authority to consider additional evidence on remand.  
Nor do they persuade us to create an exception under the facts of this case, because they 
are factually distinguishable. 
Id. 
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Circuit left discretion to the district court on the issue of additional evidence at 
resentencing.249  The court next dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s holdings in 
United States v. Monroe and United States v. Hudson because, although their 
holdings seemingly conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s final decision, the Eighth 
Circuit did not provide sufficient explanation for its decisions in those cases.250  
The court then distinguished United States v. Leonzo and United States v. 
Parker on the grounds that both holdings “rely only on cases that are 
distinguishable both from the circumstances to which these two courts applied 
them and from the circumstances of the present case.”251  In distinguishing 
Leonzo, the Ninth Circuit noted that the D.C. Circuit had relied on a case, 
United States v. Schneider, in which the limited scope of resentencing was 
irrelevant because the government could not meet its burden even with 
additional evidence252 and two cases “where consideration of additional 
evidence could not have changed the outcome.”253  In distinguishing Parker, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Fourth Circuit “erroneously relied on Burks 
v. United States,” and in Parker the limited scope related “not just to a 
sentencing factor, but also to an element of a separate offense for which the 
defendant had already been tried,” while the case at bar involved only a 
sentencing factor.254  The court further reasoned that the Fourth Circuit “did 
not offer any other authority to support its decision.”255  The court then 
explained that in each case cited except Hudson, the district court had 
contemplated the relevant factual issue but ultimately reached an erroneous 
conclusion, while the district court in the case at bar erroneously believed it did 
not need to examine statutes or certified copies of conviction, which was a 
legal error.256 
The court then grounded its holding in prior Ninth Circuit precedent, 
namely in United States v. Standard, in which the Ninth Circuit allowed the 
district court to consider additional evidence at resentencing concerning the 
government’s tax loss, because the district court had erred at the first 
sentencing hearing and did not make any factual findings.257  Based on this 
 
 249. Id. (discussing United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 831–32 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 250. Id. at 887–88 (discussing States v. Monroe, 978 F.2d 433, 435–36 (8th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Hudson, 129 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 251. Id. at 888 (discussing United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 552–54 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 252. Id. (discussing United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 557–59 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 253. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 888 (discussing United States v. Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d 835, 
839 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 254. Id. at 888 (discussing the application of Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), by the 
Fourth Circuit in United States, v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 888–89 (citing United States v. Standard, 207 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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earlier holding, the court held that there was “no reason to limit the district 
court’s authority to explore fully a factual issue at resentencing simply because 
it failed to do so during the first proceeding as a result of an erroneous legal 
ruling.”258  In doing so, the court explicitly declined to follow the Eighth 
Circuit’s holding in Hudson.259 
The court concluded by drawing some boundaries on its holding and by 
providing specific examples of restrictions.260  The court stated that its holding 
“does not preclude this court from limiting the scope of the issues for which 
we remand, and thus limiting the district court’s consideration to evidence and 
arguments relevant to those issues.”261  In addition, the court retained 
exceptions to its general rule “that the district court resentence de novo to 
‘preclude consideration of post-sentencing conduct’” and again emphasized its 
ability to limit review of “conduct beyond the scope of the issues [on] which 
we remand.”262  The court further explained that this list of exceptions is not 
exhaustive and that “there may be other circumstances under which it might be 
appropriate to limit the evidence that the district court may consider on 
remand, such as if the government engaged in deceptive, obstructive, or 
otherwise inappropriate conduct.”263  The court concluded by noting that none 
of the exceptions applied because Matthews’s objection was “not entirely 
clear,” which, at least in part, excused the government’s failure to meet its 
burden.264 
As this ruling was unfavorable to Matthews, he sought review by the 
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, but the Court declined review.265  
Since Matthews II, subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have applied this holding.266 
 
 258. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 889. 
 259. Id. at 889 n.3 (“We therefore decline to create an exception to our general practice based 
on Hudson . . . where, as in Standard, the district court erroneously failed to respond to the 
defendant’s objections to the presentence report and adopted it without hearing additional 
evidence.”) (citations omitted). 
 260. Id. at 889. 
 261. Id. (emphasis in original) 
 262. Id. (quoting United States v. Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 263. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 889. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Matthews v. United States, 535 U.S. 1120, 1120 (2002). 
 266. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Hernandez, 72 F. App’x 686 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(allowing the district court on resentencing to consider additional state court documents to 
determine if the defendant’s prior conviction qualified as a violent crime for purposes of U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Varela-Marquez, 45 
F. App’x 820 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the district court on resentencing to review any state court 
documents to determine if the defendant’s prior conviction was an aggravated felony for purposes 
of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)). 
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C. Eighth Circuit Rule Superior to Ninth Circuit Rule 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Gammage and the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Matthews II could possibly be synthesized.  On many issues, the holdings 
agreed on a course of action.  The ability to restrict the district court regarding 
a tangential issue would likely be agreed upon.267  If the successfully appealed 
issue was a novel question of law—one which the government would not have 
known to provide evidence—the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit would likely 
agree on an open record.  Similarly, if the district court erroneously misled the 
government into withholding evidence which would have sustained the issue 
or enhancement, the circuits would likely agree on an open record.  Despite 
these similarities, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
Hudson and instead applied a narrower set of circumstances in which it would 
limit the scope of resentencing to the existing record.268  Clearly then, there are 
instances in which the circuits would disagree, and the facts of Gammage 
might be such an instance. 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Gammage is, unlike the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Matthews II, supported by a series of holdings from other circuits 
and within the Eighth Circuit,269 whereas the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Matthews II distinguishes and rejects those cases, and ultimately relies on prior 
Ninth Circuit holdings.270  The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Gammage is also 
supported by a number of fundamental legal principles which dictate, in effect, 
that the government should not be permitted to make multiple attempts at 
meeting its evidentiary burden in a criminal case.271  Although no single 
principle dominates, the spirit of these principles mandates fairness, finality, 
and repercussions, each of which is offended when the government enjoys a 
“second bite at the apple” at the defendant’s expense.  This concept seems so 
embedded in the fabric of fundamental fairness that it is difficult to believe 
otherwise. 
 
 267. United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779–80 (8th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the 
court’s broad ability to limit the government on remand); Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 889 
(recognizing the court’s ability to limit issues considered by the district court on remand). 
 268. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 889 n.3. 
 269. Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779 (citing United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1043–44 
(8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Houston, 338 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Hudson, 129 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 
1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Otey, 259 F. App’x 901, 902–03 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
 270. Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 887–89 (citing United States v. Standard, 270 F.3d 1136, 1142–
43 (9th Cir. 2000); discussing United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 831–32 (3d Cir. 1995); 
distinguishing and dismissing United States v. Monroe, 978 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1992); Hudson, 
129 F.3d at 995; Leonzo, 50 F.3d at 1088; United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 553–54 (4th Cir. 
1994)). 
 271. See supra notes 122–34. 
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The Eighth Circuit’s holding also places the responsibility on the 
government, while the Ninth Circuit places the responsibility on the district 
court without repercussions to the government.272  While the Eighth Circuit’s 
rule provides for an open record when the district court misleads the 
government, the Ninth Circuit’s rule provides for an open record anytime the 
district court commits an error of law and does not make factual findings.273  
Whether the law is “clearly established” might always be a point of contention, 
but ultimately, the government bears the burden when seeking a sentencing 
enhancement.274  As the Supreme Court explained in Green, the government 
should rarely, if ever, have an excuse for failing to meet its burden.275  The 
Eighth Circuit’s holding reflects that reality. 
V.  SUBSEQUENT EIGHTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF GAMMAGE 
Since deciding Gammage, the Eighth Circuit has had occasion to apply the 
principles contained therein.  Each of the cases employed a different aspect of 
Gammage, yet led to consistent results. 
A. United States v. King 
In King, the defendant pled guilty to illegally possessing a firearm.276  The 
district court found the defendant had three violent felony convictions and 
imposed a longer sentence under the ACCA.277  The Eighth Circuit considered 
whether the defendant’s prior juvenile delinquency adjudication qualified as a 
violent felony under the ACCA.278  The government presented the district 
court with the defendant’s delinquent conduct adjudication order and 
predisposition report as evidence that the juvenile adjudication was a violent 
felony.279  Although the order and report were ambiguous, the district court 
found that under the Eighth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Vincent, the 
defendant’s juvenile adjudication was a violent felony.280 
 
 272. Compare Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779, with Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 888–89. 
 273. Compare Gammage, 580 F.3d at 779–80, with Matthews II, 278 F.3d at 889–90. 
 274. See, e.g., United States v. Khang, 904 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Once we 
embrace the adversarial nature of a sentencing procedure, the burden of proof falls on the party 
asserting the sentencing adjustment.”), abrogated by United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
 275. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957). 
 276. United States v. King, 598 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2010).   The defendant violated 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g).  Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1045. 
 280. Id. at 1045–46 (citing United States v. Vincent, 519 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 
129 S. Ct. 996 (2009)). 
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The Eighth Circuit reversed, explaining that Vincent did not hold that 
every conviction for violating the relevant juvenile statute was a violent felony, 
and that the district court misapplied the categorical approach for determining 
whether a conviction falls within the “otherwise” clause of the ACCA.281 
Applying Gammage, the court explicitly placed no limitations on the scope 
of evidence the district court could consider at resentencing.282  The court 
recognized that this was “a departure from what [it had] described as ‘the 
traditional path’ of limiting the [g]overnment to one bite at the apple.”283  The 
court reasoned that because the government and district court “mistakenly 
relied on an excessively broad interpretation of Vincent I, which might have 
impeded full development of the record,” and because “defense counsel did not 
clearly explain his objection to the sentence enhancement,” although his 
“objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review,” there was 
sufficient confusion of the applicable legal principles to warrant an open record 
on remand.284 
Thus, King is an example of the outer bounds of Gammage, and it contains 
additional reasoning for imposing and, when the circumstances require, not 
imposing restrictions on the district court on remand. 
B. United States v. Van Nguyen 
In Van Nguyen, the defendant appealed the district court’s order requiring 
him to forfeit his automobile, home, and $500,000 after he and his family 
members were convicted of drug-related crimes stemming from his family’s 
marijuana business.285  The Eighth Circuit found the government did not 
establish that the automobile was sufficiently connected to the continuing 
criminal enterprise.286  After conceding the lack of a sufficient connection 
between the automobile and the continuing criminal enterprise, the government 
argued on appeal that the automobile was a “substitute asset” that could be 
applied against the $500,000 money judgment.287 
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the district court did not order the 
forfeiture of the automobile as a substitute asset and made no finding that the 
 
 281. King, 598 F.3d 1047–50.  For greater discussion of the “otherwise” clause of the ACCA 
and application of the categorical approach, see Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141–47 
(2008); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990). 
 282. King, 598 F.3d at 1050. 
 283. Id. (quoting United States v. Gammage, 580 F.3d 777, 779–80 (8th Cir. 2009)). 
 284. Id. 
 285. United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d 886, 892, 893 (8th Cir. 2010).  There were three 
defendants, one who appealed his sentence, one who appealed her conviction, and one who 
appealed his conviction and the district court’s forfeiture order.  Id. at 890. 
 286. Id. at 903. 
 287. Id. 
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$500,000 money judgment was unavailable.288  Further, the government did 
not establish the fair market value of the automobile, and the Eighth Circuit, 
therefore, would not be able to accurately apply the value of the automobile 
against any of the possibly uncollected money judgment.289  Thus, the Eighth 
Circuit reversed the forfeiture order and applied Gammage in “declin[ing] to 
give the government two bites at the forfeiture apple” on remand.290 
Although Van Nguyen is an unusual application of Gammage, the 
principles the Eighth Circuit invoked are clear, as the court explained that it 
limited the government on remand “in the interest of finality.”291  The Eighth 
Circuit’s emphasis on finality is consistent with the reasoning of Gammage and 
lends itself to a potentially broader future application. 
C. United States v. Thomas 
In Thomas, the district court relied on the PSR in finding that the 
defendant’s prior conviction of escaping custody qualified as a crime of 
violence, and imposed a longer sentence under the ACCA.292  The Eighth 
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court improperly relied on the PSR, 
which summarized a police report that would have been inadmissible at 
sentencing.293 
Despite the government’s request to the contrary, the Eighth Circuit held 
that because the government knew and failed to meet its burden at the original 
sentencing, the government could not offer additional evidence at 
resentencing.294  The court further explained that despite the government’s 
awareness of its burden, it “came to sentencing with acceptable documents but 
conceded that the documents it had been able to obtain were insufficient.”295 
Thomas stands as a straight-forward application of Gammage in that the 
government could not establish any extenuating circumstances that would 
allow it to reopen the record on remand.  The Eighth Circuit’s emphasis on the 
government’s knowledge of its burden was consistent with the underlying 
principles of Gammage. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Gammage provides much-needed guidance 
to future courts with respect to the scope of resentencing on remand.  
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d at 903. 
 291. Id. 
 292. United States v. Thomas, 630 F.3d 1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 293. Id. at 1057 (citing United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 324, 328 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 294. Thomas, 630 F.3d at 1057. 
 295. Id. 
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Inconsistencies within the Eighth Circuit itself and among courts around the 
country created an aura of uncertainty, which Gammage dispelled by 
articulating a clear, logical rule for courts to follow. 
Although the specific contours of the permissible scope of resentencing 
remain somewhat undefined, the legal principles set forth in Gammage296 
provide sufficient guidance for courts in cases with varying facts.  Further, 
subsequent Eighth Circuit holdings have aided in the interpretation and 
application of Gammage.  Nevertheless, to avoid any future confusion and to 
insure uniformity among the circuits, when the opportunity arises, the Supreme 
Court should accept the opportunity to adopt the holding of Gammage and 
hold the government accountable for meeting its burden in its first bite at the 
apple. 
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